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RESUMO 
No dia 5 de outubro de 2016, o Supremo Tribunal 
Federal do Brasil decidiu que a prisão de condenados 
em segunda instância antes da res juricata não afeta o 
artigo 283 do Código do Processo Penal. O objetivo 
deste estudo é analisar, sem julgar a constitucionalida-
de do novo ato jurídico, a hipótese que “a possibilida-
de de prisão de condenados em segunda instância foi 
uma decisão correta para reduzir o crime e seu custo 
social”. Esta hipótese não é rejeitada do ponto de vista 
da teoria econômica do crime. 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
On October 5, 2016, the Brazilian Federal Supreme 
Court decided that imprisonment of convicts in se-
cond-instance before the res judicata does not affect 
article 283 of the Penal Code. The objective of this 
study is to analyze, without judging the constitutional-
ity of the novel juridical act, the hypothesis that “the 
possibility of imprisonment of convicts in second 
instance was a correct decision to reduce crime and its 
social cost”. This hypothesis is not rejected pursuant 
to the economic theory of crime. 
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Social cost. 
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1. Introduction 
 
razil is a global underperformer in tackling both corruption and violence. Ac-
cording to the Corruption Perception Index 2015, Brazil is ranked 76th in cor-
ruption among 168 countries part of the Index, bellow other developing coun-
tries.
3 
When it comes to violence, according to the 2016 Atlas of Violence, 
Brazil amounted to astonishing 59.627 total homicides in 2014 (Cerqueira et al., 2016, p. 8). 
In 2012, it was the country with the highest absolute number of gunfire homicides in the 
world and 10th worst in the world in gunfire homicide rates (20.7 per 100.000) among the 90 
countries analyzed.
4
 Thus, society has pressed authorities for reducing violence and corrup-
tion. Demonstrations have taken place throughout the country since 2013, especially empha-
sizing combating the generalized feeling of corruption and impunity that stimulates potential 
and hardened criminals. 
On October 5, 2016, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court (STF) decided, by 6 votes to 
5, that Article 283
5
 of the Penal Code does not hinder the execution of punishment after sen-
tence in second instance. The STF, in rejecting the injunctions appealed in the Declaratory 
Constitutional Actions 43 and 44, maintained what had been previously stipulated in Habeas 
Corpus in February of the same year. On November 10, 2016, ministers voted for the general 
repercussion of such reading. By 6 votes to 4, the STF confirmed imprisonment of individuals 
sentenced in second instance courts is valid for all cases.
6
 
The decision implicated reactions through public notes of associations, jurists and 
NGOs. According to Article 37 of the Federal Constitution, all public-sector activities must 
obey the principle of efficiency.
7
 In general, the decision is also not foreign to the new Code 
of Civil Procedure list of concerns, where efficiency is mentioned among the Brazilian legal 
system important principles. 
Without discussing the constitutional merit of this new reading,
8
 the hypothesis evalu-
ated in this study is: “the possibility of imprisonment after second-instance sentences was a 
                                                     
3
 Available in: http://goo.gl/wKHKGF. Accessed on 5 December, 2016. 
4
 Mapa da Violência 2015, p. 87. Available in: http://goo.gl/jkDH7O. Accessed on 5 December, 2016. 
5
 Art. 283. No one shall be arrested except in flagrant offense or by written and substantiated order of the 
competent judicial authority, as a result of a final judgment of conviction or, in the course of the investigation 
or of the proceeding, by reason of temporary arrest or preventive detention. (Writing given by Law No. 12.403, 
of 2011).  
§1. The precautionary measures provided for in this Title do not apply to the offense to which a custodial 
sentence is not isolated, cumulative or alternatively prescribed punishment of liberty deprivation. 
(Included by Law No. 12.403, of 2011). 
§2. The arrest may be carried out on any day and at any time, subject to restrictions on the inviolability of 
the domicile. (Included by Law No. 12.403, of 2011). 
6
 Source: O Globo, http://goo.gl/OOODvH. Accessed on November 11, 2016. 
7
 Art. 37.  Direct and indirect public administration of any of the Union, States, Federal District, and Municipali-
ties branches of power will obey the principles of legality, impersonality, morality, publicity, and efficiency, and 
also the following: (Writing given by Constitutional Amendment nº 19, of 1998) 
8
 The fact we will not be addressing the constitutional problem of the new reading does not mean it is not an 
important issue to address. In fact, most of the juridical discussion over the new reading involved the constitu-
B 
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correct decision to reduce crime and its social cost”. We evaluate this hypothesis based on the 
economic theory of crime. Despite motivated by STF’s recent decision, the theoretical reflec-
tion advanced in this paper can also be applied to similar cases from other countries, especial-
ly in those with high levels of judicial inefficiency (see Djankov et al., 2001), and within this 
group, Latin American countries (see Staats et al., 2005).
9
 
We assert that Becker (1968) is the milestone of the economic approach on crime, that 
was consolidated as a specific branch of economic science designed to investigate and answer 
questions related to crime and punishment problems, according to Posner (1998). The empiri-
cal investigation of the causes of crime appeared earlier on, emerging during the 1960s in the 
Unites Stated through Fleisher (1963, 1966), Smigel-Leibowistz (1965) and Ehrlich (1967). 
Although Becker was the first to use mathematics to structure a theoretical model of criminal 
behavior, several instances of economic outlook on crime can be found in classics from the 
XVIII century such as Adam Smith and Cesare Beccaria (see Conti and Justus, 2016). Once 
consolidated, the ideas of Becker (1968) influenced authors like Stigler (1970), Sjoquist 
(1973) and Ehrlich (1973), who proposed variants of Becker’s theory. 
Last, it should be emphasized that we do not discuss the merit of the decision concern-
ing the doctrine of law per se. The rest of this paper is structured in three sections. Section 2 
shows the method applied. Section 3 presents the major cornerstones of Becker’s economic 
theory of crime and our theoretical analyses from its hypotheses. We conclude in Section 4. 
2. Method 
 
Our analyses must face the current limitation of having no available dataset to test the 
impact this new STF reading has on criminal behavior. Thus, we apply a deductive approach 
starting with some hypotheses on criminal behavior in order to derive their logical conclu-
sions. For our deduction, we hold the theory of crime developed by Becker (1968). Our hy-
potheses are evaluated by deducing the prospective impacts expected by possible imprison-
ment immediately after conviction in second instance courts both on the structure of crime 
incentives and deterrents, as well as on the supply of judicial services, and their respective 
costs. From a classical theoretical framework, we make predictions of consequences (if the 
theoretical hypotheses are indeed correct) on expected benefits from offenses, expected costs 
from offenses, judicial efficiency, and social cost of offenses.  
We assume decisions in second instance courts are correct, that is, the convict is re-
sponsible for the crime committed.
10
 We also assume punishments are adequately measured 
                                                                                                                                                                      
 
tional principle of in dubio pro reo. Thus, our discussion does not substitute nor invalidate any juridical discus-
sion attempted by other approaches to law on the decision’s constitutional status and legitimacy. What we 
offer is an analysis of the expected socioeconomic consequences of the decision for key variables such as crime 
rates, juridical and judiciary costs, crime costs, and judicial efficiency. 
9
 A general theoretical approach to the desirability of immediate applications of punishments for social welfare 
can be found in Bugarin et al. (2011), whose work is mainly focused on first instance decisions. 
10
 See the subsection on judicial efficiency. 
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and punishments are efficient relative to their objectives. In other words, we conjecture ex 
ante second-instance decisions are fair. Hence, we focus on discussing how the possibility of 
imprisonment of second instance convicts will affect criminal behavior and, consequently, the 
quantity of crimes and its associated social costs. 
3. Theoretical Analyses 
 
According to Becker (1968), there are criminal activities and criminal behaviors, 
which are defined by law. Thus, the morality involved does not play a determinant role for the 
definition of crime, which is understood as an illicit economic activity. 
The theory central hypothesis is any individual, in deciding on law-abiding or illicit-
ness in his or her activities, makes a rational choice. This conjecture is realistic in view of the 
low percentage of second-instance sentences which are reverted after appeal to superior 
courts.
11
 
Hereafter, with the intention of substantiating the evaluation of the hypothesis alleged 
in Section 1, we succinctly present the theoretical framework elaborated by Becker (1968), 
without the objective of scrutinizing all its underpinnings or relations. 
Assume the existence of a supply function of crime given by 
                  (1) 
where    is the number of offenses committed by individual  ,    is the probability of 
failure or conviction,    is the punishment for offense if convicted and    represents all other 
variables that influence decisions of committing an offense. 
Insofar as only convicted offenders are punished, there is a sort of price discrimination 
in criminal activities. If convicted, individual   will pay   for the committed offense, seeing 
that in this case   value is positive. Otherwise,   value is null. 
We define an offense expected utility as 
         (     )               (2) 
where    is the monetary income (or psychological gain) from an offense,    is the 
utility function,    is the probability of conviction and    is interpreted as the monetary equiv-
alent of punishment if convicted. 
Supposing that the marginal utility from income is positive, one can deduct from Eqs. 
1 and 2 that 
    
   
   and 
    
   
  . An increase in    or    reduces the expected utility from 
                                                     
11
 In the economic theory, rational behavior simply implies consistent optimization of a well-ordered function, 
such as a utility function or profit function (see Becker, 1962). 
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an offense and, thus, tend to reduce the number of offenses, either because the probability of 
paying a price is higher or because the price itself is higher. That is, 
   
   
   and 
   
   
   .  
The effect from changes in    in Eq. 1 can also be predicted. For example, higher 
earnings from legal activities increase the opportunity cost of an offense, reduce incentive of 
committing illegal activities, thus implies reduction in the quantity of offenses. 
The aggregate supply of crimes is defined as the sum of all committed offenses,   . 
Evidently, total offenses depend on the combination of   ,    and    in the locality, and each 
component value differs among individuals. However, for simplicity, Becker (1968) consid-
ered the average values of these variables, denoted by  ,   and  , where   is given by 
 
  ∑
    
∑   
 
   
 
   
 (3) 
adopting the same process for other variables, Eq. 1 is written as the aggregate supply 
function of offenses, 
              (4) 
where   is the damage to society,   are the costs of combating crime,    is the social 
cost of offenses and   is the level of criminal activity. It is expected that 
  
  
  , 
  
  
  , and 
 
  
   
  . 
Becker (1968) presupposes the social loss function is equivalent to the function of to-
tal social loss in terms of real income from offenses, convictions and punishments, given by 
                    (5) 
where    is the loss from punished offenses and    is the number of punished offens-
es. Therefore,      is the total social loss from punishments. 
It is noteworthy to highlight the variables under social control are the total expenditure 
on combating crime,  ; the punishment per offense for those convicted,  ; and the form of 
punishment given by  . Once the values of theses variables are chosen, the values of  ,  ,   
are also determined. Moreover, the social loss,  , is given by functions of  ,   and  . 
In this context, social objective should be to choose values for  ,   and   that mini-
mize   and induce individuals to commit an “optimum” number of offenses (  ). 
In sum, theory predicts an individual will rationally choose to commit an offense if the 
expected utility from such choice exceeds utility which could be derived by allocating time 
and other resources on the best legal activities options. Thus, the choice is made by comparing 
costs and benefits from both alternatives – criminal and non-criminal. 
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Closer examination of Becker (1968) theory highlights moral cost is an important fac-
tor in variable   . The likelihood of being defamed, loosing prestige and status in society im-
poses costs on crime decisions. In addition to this onus, individuals face the cost of social 
stigma, which is calculated by the difference in earnings between ex-convicts and equivalent 
workers without criminal records (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000; Rasmusen, 1996; Posner, 
1980). 
Alike other areas of the Law and Economics movement, the economic approach on 
crimes and punishments is divided in two applications: positive and normative (Posner, 1979). 
In positive analysis, law is basically conceived as a system of incentives that influences the 
structure of costs and benefits each individual is subjected to. Positive analysis objective is to 
clarify, explain and predict how agents will reacts to the creation, modification, or extinction 
of laws, and to changes in forms of policing, investigation, judgment, sentence and punish-
ment. 
In the economic approach to crime positive analysis, there are no theoretical incompat-
ibilities between this approach and the reading of any other doctrine of law. Such incompati-
bilities only arise in normative analysis. Economic theory on crime normative analysis pre-
scribes the social choice between laws, regulations and institutions must be based on the crite-
rion of maximizing economic efficiency. Hence, whichever incentive structure provides 
greater benefits for lower costs must be taken as the most socially desirable one.
12
 
Therefore, knowledge on expected behavioral reactions and its costs and benefits – 
knowledge created by the positive analysis of the economic theory on crime – is always a 
necessary condition for a normative analysis in the economic theory on crime. However, this 
knowledge is also valuable for society even if, ultimately, the normative criterion of ordering 
priorities turns out differently. At least, any social choice will be made acknowledging its 
possible consequences on agents’ behavior and social cost. 
In this theoretical context, below we shed light on the likely effect of the law allowing 
possible imprisonment of individuals convicted in second instance courts. Based on the eco-
nomic theory of crime detailed in the previous section, there are at least four expected effects. 
First, the adopted measure reduces the expected benefits from offense as defined in 
             from Eq. 2; second, it increases the expected costs from committing offenses, 
as also predicted in             from Eq. 2; third, it increases the judicial efficiency as 
stipulated in        and      from Eq. 5; last, but not the least, the measure reduces the 
social cost of crime – inclusively of judicial process – also as predicted in Eq. 5. We shall 
treat each one of these possible effect hereafter. 
3.1. Expected benefits from offenses 
As consequence of STF new reading, the economic theory of crime predicts an in-
crease in the probability of imprisonment, i.e., in    of Eq. 1. This effect will be caused by the 
                                                     
12
 For a general analysis of different schools of thought in Law and Economics movement and discussions con-
cerning implications of normative criteria of maximization, see Parisi (2004). 
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reduction of available licit (and illicit) means of avoiding the effective application of impris-
onment sentences. Here we assume the probability of conviction is inversely related to the 
time elapsed between second-instance conviction and the last appeal resorted by convicts. 
The expected impact from an increased perceived probability of conviction, i.e. in pj, 
on the supply of offenses is valid because, ceteris paribus, the benefit expected from crime 
will be smaller, as shown in term              of Eq. 2. In sum, the risk of crime failure 
(treated here as an imprisonment) is greater in view of the possibility of imprisonment right 
after second-instance conviction. 
As pointed by Becker (1968, p. 178), criminal behavior leans toward risk preference. 
Therefore, a percentage increase in    implies greater reduction in the number of offenses 
committed by an individual   (i.e., in   ) than an equal percentage increase in punishment 
severity, expressed by the term    in Eq. 2. 
Applying the structure of the completely static model elaborated by Becker (1968) to 
the decision of hardened criminals, ceteris paribus, we expect an increase in the probability of 
conviction reduces the number of offenses, in other words,            . We can also expect 
the same effect to occurs even if the adopted measure coincided with a reduction on the aver-
age intensity of prison time, in a magnitude necessary to counter the increase in   , such that 
the value of      remains unaltered. 
We emphasize, however, increases in    on the aggregate supply of crimes (Eq. 3) 
may not be immediate and do depend on the degree of agents’ perception concerning changes 
in   . 
3.2. Expected costs from offenses 
The possibility of imprisonment before res judicata increases the probability of failure 
(  ) and, consecutively, increases the expected cost of committing an offense through Eq. 2 
term            . 
Aside the effect on the probability of being punished, by significantly reducing the 
time between second instance conviction and prison sentence execution, the measure also 
increases the expected cost of punishment,   . 
The majority of individuals tend to attribute greater utility to current than future earn-
ings. In this sense, insofar as the psychological impact of the costs may also have the same 
form, the relative importance of the costs involved in choosing for illegal activities tends to 
reduce over time. 
Assessing Eq. 2 in two alleged periods  , and assuming            , it is possible that 
                    for equal values of the function arguments. Thus, as time interval reduc-
tion approximates the criminal act to its punishment, the expected cost from the choice of 
committing an offense tends to increase and, consequently, may cause deterrence on criminal 
behaviors. Hence, the reduction of the number of offenses will also likely occur through this 
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medium, i.e., by the reduction of the time interval between conviction in second instance 
courts and imprisonment. Pellegrina (2008) empirical analysis of judicial efficiency on crimes 
based in Italy indeed find a “significant positive effect of trials duration on crimes”. 
Polinsky and Shavell (1999) state the first years in prison have greater effect on crimi-
nal behavior compared to the last ones, especially for white-collar offenses. Thus, measures 
that increase the probability pj of the offender being punished, despite moderately, tend to be 
more effective to reduce the number of offenses than changes in punishment per se.
13
 
Another variable influenced by direct increases in the possibility of imprisonment and 
by diminishing time intervals until punishment is the moral cost of crime. Although the con-
cept has been explained in studies posterior to Becker (1968), the moral cost is part of term    
in Eq. 1. This notion appears as a “willingness to commit an illegal act” (Becker, 1968, p. 
177). 
The psychological impact on the decision of agents is the internalization of the cost of 
being defamed among close circle of contacts or, depending of the crime and profession of the 
offender, stigmatized in society as a whole. As recaptured by Conti and Justus (2016), Adam 
Smith more than two centuries ago considered the search for social recognition as a determi-
nant factor to understand human behavior. However, such internalization can only occur if 
society and legal institutions are indeed able to identify those who committed offenses. Oth-
erwise, not only such deterrence effect may not hold, but also the non-creation of some level 
of moral cost and/or social stigma will overvalue the income from offenses, thus increasing its 
expected utility (Rasmusen, 1996, pp. 536-537). 
It is possible the same expected effects on criminal behavior tend to reduce incentives 
to recurrently appeal judicial decisions until res judicata without any significant chance of 
reverting the decision from inferior instances. Unarguably, such attitude is commonly adopted 
in Brazil, especially by convicts who possess sufficient income and/or property to bear the 
cost of the judicial process and attorney’s fees. 
The reduction of incentives would occur because when a convicted individual is in jail 
he or she incurs direct and indirect losses resulting from punishment   . Thus, the only benefit 
from appealing second-instance conviction – even without a minimal chance of success in 
reversing sentences – is the reduction of the marginal moral cost of crime as a result of the 
effect on society of being perceived as victim of injustice. We emphasize, however, this al-
leged reduction of moral cost is only relevant if the individual could appeal in liberty. Either 
to society as a whole or to the convict close social circle, the psychological effect of immedi-
ate imprisonment after conviction in second instance is more severe than the effect of appeal-
ing judicial decisions until res judicata. 
Lastly, concerning the expected cost to commit an offense, while the convicted indi-
vidual is in prison there will be a reduction in his income from crime or from eventual sources 
of licit income. By increasing the convict’s budget constraint, the marginal cost of defense 
                                                     
13
 Sjoquist (1973) already observed such temporal effect on the quantity of offenses. 
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may become an obstacle to appeal without chance of success. In other words, the convict in 
second instance will tend not to “appeal for appealing sake”. It is obvious such effect on ap-
peals until res juricata would be problematic if the percentage of decisions reverted in favor 
of convicts after appeals to higher instances was high. But, as will be seen in subsequent sec-
tion, the percentage of second instance courts decisions reverted is low in Brazilian judicial 
system.  
3.3. Judicial Efficiency 
The quality of sentences is fundamental for the relations which we discuss in this pa-
per because, as argued by Pinheiro (2016), a wrong judicial decision, aside being unfair, can 
distort incentives and impose high social costs. In this regard, one of the STF ministers point-
ed in his vote to the “low rate of extraordinary appeal in favor of convicts, both in the STF 
(lower than 1,5%) and in the STJ (10,3%), according to data from the courts” (pp. 2, 10-11).14 
Thus, in a large number of cases, second instance court decisions are maintained until res ju-
ricata. 
In this sense, the possibility of imprisonment of second instance convicts can cause an 
increase both in the productivity as well as in the quality of higher instance sentences. As not-
ed in the social cost function   (Eq. 5), the cost function undergoes a shift. In other words, for 
equal values of   and   the value of        can be lower than it would be in light of the pos-
sibility of punishment procrastination until res juricata. 
Unarguably, reducing the number of new processes in the judicial system permits a re-
duction in the stock of processes awaiting trial, which in turn implies a lower average time for 
trails and a reduction in the average cost of each judicial process registered in the system. 
The average cost of each cleared process in the STF and STJ (Supreme Justice Court) 
is substantial to society. In 2015, for example, total expenditure was R$ 1.9 billion,
15
 repre-
senting an average cost of R$ 2.968 per cleared process.
16
 
There is another aspect in need of consideration aside the high average cost of pro-
cesses. On the one hand, once the stock of processes awaiting judicial sentence is substantial-
ly reduced, it will be possible for superior courts to reduce the number of cleared processes by 
working hour. This will certainly increase the quality of each trial. On the other hand, there 
are no reasons to expect that the possibility of imprisonment of convicts in second instance 
courts would cause an increase in the total number of cleared processes by superior courts. 
According to a study about the efficiency and productivity of the Brazilian judiciary system, 
conducted by the Institute of Applied Economic Research, the main obstacles to an increase in 
                                                     
14
 Source: http://goo.gl/QeB5Sj. Accessed in October 10, 2016. 
15
 Figures of the Budget Execution of Judiciary Organs, available in: http://goo.gl/SmxpgL and in the Justiça em 
Números 2015 (p. 164) report, available in http://goo.gl/8KY0Ye. 
16
 This figure is an estimated average cost per process in superior instances taking into account 641.964 cleared 
process by the STJ and STF in 2015, provided in the 2015 Annual CNJ Report, p. 56, available in: 
https://goo.gl/n5gxdt. The average cost per process can be decomposed for the two superior courts. Neverthe-
less, our aim is only to illustrate the average cost of processes is high for the Brazilian society. 
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judicial system productivity are bureaucratic, formalist, Fordist, and outdated organizational 
process still operating in the system (Cunha et al., 2011, p. 24). 
Nevertheless, there are two factors which can reduce or nullify over time increases in 
quality of judicial services. First, although the number of process each STF minister has to 
clear is “at least three times higher than his or her colleagues had to clear 20 years ago” (Fal-
cão et al., 2014, p. 17), data from the Justice in Numbers Report indicate there is no necessari-
ly relationship between the number of processes and their average time duration. Second, as 
pointed in the same report, in this court processes with fastest decisions are those concerning 
penal law. Unarguably, penal processes will be most influenced by the new readings of the 
STF. Thus, focusing on processes which are already cleared in shorter time, the effect on ju-
dicial productivity can be significantly smaller. 
3.4. Social cost of offenses 
For the social cost of crime, we must consider the impact of changes in each compo-
nent of function   (Eq. 5). 
We treated, in previous topic, the possibility of reduction of the value of component 
      . The cost of damages from offenses,     , strictly depends on the final effect which 
STF recent decision will cause on the number of committed offenses. Until now, all the rela-
tions we analyzed suggest a reduction in the number of crimes. There is no reason for an in-
crease in the average harm per offense due to the possibility of imprisonment of second in-
stance convicts. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the value of   tends to fall over time. 
However, the expected effect on the value of     , that is the cost of the punitive system for 
each punished convict, still needs analysis. 
As already discussed, regarding the cost of punishments   , STF new reading does not 
increase severity of punishments. However, the reduction of time interval between conviction 
and imprisonment may cause a psychological effect on individuals’ behavior. This, in turn, 
will reduce the expected utility from crime analogously as the case would be if modifications 
in criminal law increased the intensity of punishments,  . 
The probability of failure  , conceived as the probability of punishment, tends to in-
crease alongside the possibility of imprisonment of second instance convicts. This, in turn, 
increases the punitive system cost. However, as the number of crimes   will be lower, it is 
not possible to predict the change net effect on total social loss from punishments (    ). 
Nevertheless, as only a low percentage of appeals after second-instance decisions are won, it 
is less likely that the new STF readings will cause an increase of prison population over time, 
since it only enables immediate imprisonment after second instance conviction. It is, however, 
obvious prison population will increase in the short run. But, such undesired effect on prison 
population may be reduced or even nullified if thousands of prisoners with freedom rights 
were freed.
17
 
                                                     
17
 Law 12.714/12 treats the monitoring system of sentence execution, provisional arrest and security measure, 
stipulated measures that aim to reduce such awful fact. Nonetheless, such type of law violation is still common 
in the Brazilian prison system. 
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Thus, by anticipating imprisonment before res juricata and extending the deterrence 
effect due to the efficiency of the institutional system, which implies increase in the probabil-
ity   of failure in crime, it is reasonable to expect prison system pressure over time to reduce 
instead of increase, since 
   
   
  . Therefore, in the long run expenditure on punishment per 
offense      will not increase. On the contrary, a reduction is likely to occur due to lower   
caused by the deterrence effect of a greater probability of imprisonment. 
Considering the diverse paths through which STF new reading may affect costs, a re-
duction in the social cost of crime,  , is possible. This is the case because there will be a sig-
nificant deterrence effect on individuals’ behavior, which will reduce the value of      
through reduction in the level of crime; also, because there will be reduction in the juridical 
cost of the system as a whole through reduction in       ; and finally because there will be 
little to no modification on prison costs of convicts in second instance, in other words, the 
value of term      tends to remain constant. 
4. Conclusion 
We exclusively examined the expected effects from the possibility of imprisonment 
second instance convicts – the new reading of the STF concerning article 283 of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure – on the rational choice of an individual to commit or not to commit an 
offense. We deduced the major hypothetical effects based on the economic theory of criminal 
behavior. We emphasize that, in this paper, we do not assess the constitutionality of this new 
juridical reading. Our analysis focus was on the expected repercussions on public safety and 
social costs. 
The resultant vector of expected effects outlined in this study points towards a more 
economically efficient incentive structure. All reaction vectors of costs and benefits of crimi-
nal activity indicate reduction of its expected utility and, consequently, reduction in the num-
ber of crimes. 
We emphasize the expected increase in quality of judicial services may not occur in 
substantial magnitudes due to the weight of other important variables on work overload, such 
as excessive bureaucracy prevailing in the system. Nevertheless, the major positive economic 
impact expected on judicial actions is the reduction in average time of clearing processes in 
the third instance. This will certainly have a positive effect by reducing the social costs of 
judicial activity as a whole. 
The guiding hypothesis of this study is not refuted after the theoretical analyses carried 
out in previous section, based on solid theoretical references presented in Section 2. Thus, 
“the possibility of imprisonment of second instance convicts was a correct decision to reduce 
crime and its social cost”. The estimation of the empirical impact is crucial, as soon as data 
permit. The only possible alternative is to investigate the effect of the new STF reading using 
time series and applying, for instance, an intervention analysis on the series behavior. Lastly, 
in the absence of data, analogous type of theoretical analysis realized in this study can be ap-
plied to positive analysis in countries facing a similar decision-making situation. 
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